Incomplete Information Dynamic Games
Incomplete Information
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
- \(\mathcal{S}\) - State space
- \(T:\mathcal{S}\times \mathcal{A} \times\mathcal{S} \to \mathbb{R}\) - Transition probability distribution
- \(\mathcal{A}\) - Action space
- \(R:\mathcal{S}\times \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}\) - Reward
- \(\mathcal{O}\) - Observation space
- \(Z:\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A}\times \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{O} \to \mathbb{R}\) - Observation probability distribution
Alleatory
Epistemic (Static)
Epistemic (Dynamic)
Partially Observable Markov Game
Alleatory
Epistemic (Static)
Epistemic (Dynamic)
Interaction
- \(\mathcal{S}\) - State space
- \(T(s' \mid s, \bm{a})\) - Transition probability distribution
- \(\mathcal{A}^i, \, i \in 1..k\) - Action spaces
- \(R^i(s, \bm{a})\) - Reward function
- \(\mathcal{O}^i, \, i \in 1..k\) - Observation space
- \(Z(o^i \mid \bm{a}, s')\) - Observation probability distribution
Partially Observable Markov Game
Hierarchy of Problems
Belief updates?
Reduction to Simple Game
Reduction to Simple Game
Pruning in Dynamic Programming
Extensive Form Game
(Alternative to POMGs that is more common in the literature)
- Similar to a minimax tree for a turn-taking game
- Chance nodes
- Information sets
Extensive Form Game
(Alternative to POMGs that is more common in the literature)
- Similar to a minimax tree for a turn-taking game
- Chance nodes
- Information sets
Extensive Form Game
Extensive-form game definition (\(h\) is a sequence of actions called a "history"):
- Finite set of \(n\) players, plus the "chance" player
- \(P(h)\) (player at each history)
- \(A(h)\) (set of actions at each history)
- \(I(h)\) (information set that each history maps to)
- \(U(h)\) (payoff for each leaf node in the game tree)
King-Ace Poker Example
- 4 Cards: 2 Aces, 2 Kings
- Each player is dealt a card
- P1 can either raise (\(r\)) the payoff to 2 points or check (\(k\)) the payoff at 1 point
- If P1 raises, P2 can either call (\(c\)) Player 1's bet, or fold (\(f\)) the payoff back to 1 point
- The highest card wins
King-Ace Poker Example
- 4 Cards: 2 Aces, 2 Kings
- Each player is dealt a card
- P1 can either raise (\(r\)) the payoff to 2 points or check (\(k\)) the payoff at 1 point
- If P1 raises, P2 can either call (\(c\)) Player 1's bet, or fold (\(f\)) the payoff back to 1 point
- The highest card wins
Extensive to Matrix Form
Exponential in number of info states!
A more interesting example: Kuhn Poker
Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games
This slide not covered on exam
Heinrich et al. 2015 "Fictitious Self Play in Extensive-Form Games"
Deep Stack: Scaling to Heads Up No Limit Texas Hold 'Em
Can game learning methods like CFR be used in Large POMGs?
Title Text
Next Year: Add papers like the stratego paper, AlphaStar, etc.
255 Incomplete Information Games
By Zachary Sunberg
255 Incomplete Information Games
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